In diesem Aufsatz wird der jeweils mögliche Beitrag verschiedener Experten, insbesondere von Fachphilosophen und Naturwissenschaftlern, zu einer allgemeinen Diskussion derjenigen ethischen und rechtlichen Fragen erörtert, die sich in Verbindung mit dem Genomprojekt stellen. Wir kommen zu dem Ergebnis, daß man die tatsächlich schon betriebene Forschung keinesfalls wird aufhalten können, sondern allenfalls bestimmte für bedenklich gehaltene Anwendungen der neuen Techniken verzögern oder verhindern kann. Wir stellen verschiedene Probleme vor, die die Wirksamkeit der philosophischen Reflexion in solchen Fragen zweifelhaft erscheinen läßt, die (...) mit der grundsätzlichen Unzulänglichkeit der traditionellen Verfahren angewandter Ethik, aber auch mit der Pluralität der Grundnormen in einer modernen Gesellschaft zu tun haben. So fällt der empirischen Wissenschaft eine entscheidende Rolle bei der Beurteilung der Angemessenheit bestimmter Verfahren im Hinblick auf die eine Norm zu, die allgemein vorausgesetzt werden darf, nämlich die über die Bedeutung des handgreiflichen Eigeninteresses, da dieses am ehesten in der Lage ist, die voraussichtlichen Möglichkeiten und Gefahren einer bestimmten Technik einzuschätzen. Wir behaupten, daß die bisherigen Erfahrungen mit anderen Organismen innerhalb und vor allem außerhalb von Laborato-rien auf eine Komplexität der Interaktionen der Gene untereinander und der genetischen Erbmasse mit der Umgebung hindeuten, die eine Vorhersage des Resultats beim Menschen als sehr ungewiß erscheinen läßt. Angesichts dieser Ungewißheit einerseits und des entgegengesetzten finanziellen Interesses seitens des Anbieters der neuen Techniken andererseits mag das amerikanische Zivilrecht vielleicht den stärksten Anreiz für den Anbieter darstellen, die Risiken realistisch einzuschätzen und bei der Anwendung mit der angemessenen Vorsicht zu Werke zu gehen. Noch wirksamer als jeglicher moralischer Appell mögen die finanziellen Gefahren für den überoptimistischen Anbieter sein, die Menschen als seine "Kunden" vor Schaden zu bewahren. Schließlich weisen wir auf die Schwierigkeit der Kommunikation der Ergebnisse philosophischer und wissenschaftlicher Überlegungen im Zeitalter der Massenmedien hin. Die Rationalität der Diskussion muß soweit wie möglich allererst hergestellt werden, statt daß man sie voraussetzen könnte. Dafür ist eine der größten Gefahren die Einbindung der modernen Naturwissenschaft gerade in die Industrien, deren Leistungen oder Risiken sie eigentlich beurteilen soll. (shrink)

Anhand des fiktiven Falles eines jungen Mannes, dessen Leben trotz der vermeintlichen Vorteile von verbesserten genetischen Anlagen nicht so gerät, wie es sich die Eltern vorgestellt haben, fragen wir nach dem Maßstab des Erfolgs von genetischen Interventionen am Menschen. Wir kommen zu dem Schluß, daß die bisherigen Erfahrungen, die wir an anderen, weniger komplizierten Organismen wie Algen schon gesammelt haben, darauf hindeuten, daß die Resultate von Genmanipulationen viel weniger vorhersagbar sind und damit die Risiken für die Menschen viel höher und (...) unüberschaubarer sein werden, als die Optimisten aus der Genforschung bisher anzunehmen scheinen. Außerdem stellen wir die Frage, ob diese Richtung der vermeintlichen Verbesserung des menschlichen Lebens wirklich geeignet ist, tatsächlich die Leben der einzelnen Menschen oder der Menschheit insgesamt besser zu machen, oder ob sie nicht vielmehr auf einem engen Begriff des Lebenserfolgs beruht, der von den eigentlich ethischen Fragen nach dem besseren Leben für die Menschen eher ablenkt. Wenn dies der Fall wäre, würde sich die Suche nach den entscheidenden Verbesserungen des menschlichen Lebens auf dem Wege der genetischen Intervention nicht nur aus technischen, sondern auch aus ethischen Gründen als bedenklich erweisen. (shrink)

Aufgrund der Erfahrung mit der genetischen Manipulation von nicht-menschlichen Organismen, glauben wir, dass die Risiken einer gezielten Manipulation der menschlichen Erbinformation zum Zwecke der vermeintlichen Verbesserung des Menschen in absehbarer Zukunft zu hoch und die erhofften Vorteile einer solchen Manipulation zu ungewiß bleiben werden, um Eingriffe dieser Art zu rechtfertigen. In diesem Aufsatz erklären wir, warum wir meinen, dass gesetzliche Verbote solcher Experimente mit Menschen gegenwärtig gerechtfertigt wären, und warum wir gleichwohl meinen, dass solche Verbote nicht die wichtigsten Strategien zur (...) Steuerung dieser allmählich auch wirtschaftlich sehr signifikanten Forschungsrichtung darstellen. Wir argumentieren dafür, dass die Furcht vor zivilrechtlicher Haftung für die durchaus nicht auszuschließenden Schäden solcher Versuche und der bewußte Einsatz von staatlichen Forschungsgeldern nicht nur zur Entwicklung neuer genmanipulativer Techniken, sondern auch für die gründliche und unabhängige Beurteilung der Risiken solcher Techniken viel probatere und realistischere Reaktionen auf dieses neue Phänomen darstellen. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant defines virtue as a kind of strength and resoluteness of will to resist and overcome any obstacles that oppose fulfilling our moral duties. Human agents, according to Kant, owe it to ourselves to strive for perfect virtue by fully committing ourselves to morality and by developing the fortitude to maintain and execute this life-governing policy despite obstacles we may face. This essay reviews basic features of Kant’s conception of virtue and then discusses the role of emotions, a motive (...) of duty, exemplars, rules, and community in a virtuous life. Kant thinks that striving to be more virtuous requires not only respect for moral principles and control of our contrary emotions but also a system of legally enforced rules and communities of good persons. Exemplars and cultivated good feelings and emotions can also be useful aids along the way, but Kant warns us against attempting to derive our moral standards themselves from examples or feelings. The best any of us can hope for, in Kant’s view, is to make constant progress in our difficult struggle for moral perfection. (shrink)

Frontiers Events is a rapidly growing calendar management system dedicated to the scheduling of academic events. This includes announcements and invitations, participant listings and search functionality, abstract handling and publication, related events and post-event exchanges. Whether an organizer or participant, make your event a Frontiers Event!

In this article, I analyze a concept central to the work of the Beninese philosopher Paulin Jidenu Hountondji: pluralism. Hountondji’s pluralism consists of both a theoretical pluralism, which emphasizes the importance of plurality and debate within philosophy and science, and a politico-economic pluralism, which arises in opposition to the dominative tendencies of cultural nationalism and the capitalist world-system. I contend that at the heart of both Hountondji’s theoretical and politico-economic pluralism rests a concept of negative pluralism, a political principle derived (...) from Hountondji’s immanent critique of his own historical conjuncture. I conclude that Hountondji’s negative pluralism offers a distinct and compelling account of plurality as neither innately nor instrumentally ideal. Instead, Hountondji’s negative pluralism allows us to identify, through a critique of existing political structures, forms of political compulsion and economic exploitation which function as obstacles to universal emancipation. (shrink)

In this article I argue against some contemporary scholars that Thomas Aquinas holds that grace is in some way necessary for the perfection of even natural virtue, due to original sin. First I show that healing grace is necessary for the fulfillment of ordinary natural moral duties. On account of original sin, human cannot fulfill the precept to naturally love God without healing grace. Moreover, they cannot avoid committing some acts (mortal sins) whereby they are turned away from God. (...) Second, I argue that without grace someone cannot acquire the political virtues (acquired moral virtues) that make the agent good even on a natural level, and are connected with each other through prudence. (shrink)

The distinction between Thomas and Scotus on threefold referral is superficially similar in that both use the same terminology of actual, virtual, and habitual referral. For Scotus, an act is virtually referred to the ultimate end through an agent’s somehow explicitly thinking about the end and some sort of causal connection between the virtually intended act and the actually intended act. For Thomas, someone with charity virtually refers his acts to God as the ultimate end not because the (...) act has been caused by an actually intended act, but because the act is the kind of act that can be referred to God as the ultimate end, and the agent himself is ordered to that end. Similarly, For Scotus a good act might be only habitually referred to God because the agent does not think about him. For Thomas, the fact that someone with charity would only habitually order an act to God can only be explained by a defect in the act. The act lacks a virtual order to God because it is the kind of act which cannot be so ordered. The difference between Scotus and Thomas on this issue expresses a fundamental difference over the relationship between individual acts and the ultimate end. For Thomas, every good act is orderable and this order is made virtual merely by an agent’s possession of charity. The virtual order requires an actually ordered act only to the extent that the possession of charity does. For Scotus, the order requires some sort of additional act by the agent. (shrink)

Although Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus disagree over how the acquired moral virtues are connected, the nature of their disagreement is difficult to determine. They and their contemporaries reject the Stoic understanding of this connection, according to which someone either possesses all the acquired moral virtues in the highest degree or none of these virtues at all. Both Thomas and Scotus hold that someone might generally perform just actions and yet be unchaste. Moreover, although they interpret Aristotle (...) differently, both accept the Aristotelian view that a good person is free from vice and that his virtues are connected through prudence. They agree that the just but unchaste person is not a good person. But a major difference between the two is in their understanding of the way in which the virtues are so connected and their manner of describing that imperfect or partial prudence which is possessed by such a person who does not have each of the major virtues. (shrink)

My argument has three parts. In the first, I shall explain some key Thomist distinctions concerning necessity and premotion. In the second, I shall argue that many philosophers who object to the Thomist position misconstrue the relevant understanding of necessity and contingency. In the third, I shall focus directly on their denial that the doctrine of premotion is helpful for discussions of how God moves the human will. The first two sections illustrate that the Thomists think plausibly that our understanding (...) of necessity is connected either with a logical necessity or secondary causality. Consequently, in order to show that the will is free, they argue that human actions are necessitated neither logically nor by secondary causes. In the third section, I argue that Thomists do not simply beg the question by asserting that God’s predetermining decrees are compatible with human freedom. They have an understanding of God’s causation which allows both for God’s infallible motion and the contingency of many created events, among which are free human actions. (shrink)

Thomas discusses the referral of acts to the ultimate end unsystematically and in diverse texts. These texts are interesting in that they raise difficult questions. For example, on Thomas’s view there can be a disparity between the moral value of the act and that of the ultimate end. But what does he mean when he claims that venial sins may be habitually referred to God as the supernatural ultimate end? Moreover, he claims both that every good is desired (...) for the sake of the ultimate end and that bad agents can perform good actions. How are these two statements compatible? These texts raise additional questions about the connection between the natural and supernatural ends. If, as Thomas states, unbelievers can perform good actions, is there a sense in which unbelievers can order their acts to God as a purely natural ultimate end? (shrink)

The distinctions between the different sense of "perfect" and "imperfect" virtue are essential for understanding Thomas’ view of the development of and connection between the virtues. In this article I set out a fairly traditional schema of the states of virtue and shown how they are found in Thomas’ own texts. An understanding of the distinction between imperfect and perfect acquired virtue is necessary in order to grasp the issue at stake in my previous article on the Augustianism (...) of Thomas Aquinas's Moral Theory: “The question is whether without grace someone can be good by the fact that he has acquired virtues that are perfect – that is, connected with the other virtues through prudence.”. (shrink)

The disagreement between John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham on whether the exterior act has intrinsic moral worth is a turning point for a new understanding of the relationship between the interior and the exterior act. Is someone who successfully commits murder as guilty as someone who fails in her attempt? Does the martyr merit more than someone who merely wills to undergo martyrdom but is denied the opportunity? In these cases, the completion of the act is the exterior (...) act, and the interior act is that part of the act which leads up to and includes the agent’s choice or command. Scotus synthesizes and develops an earlier tradition in which the exterior act has its own moral goodness or malice which is independent from that of the interior act. Ockham criticizes Scotus and this tradition, thus apparently becoming one of the first thinkers since Abelard to deny that the exterior act has any intrinsic moral value. Ockham redefines the exterior act as a purely natural act without intrinsic moral value and consequently traces the goodness or malice of an act entirely to an intrinsically moral act of the will. (shrink)

This Element provides an account of Thomas Aquinas's moral philosophy that emphasizes the intrinsic connection between happiness and the human good, human virtue, and the precepts of practical reason. Human beings by nature have an end to which they are directed and concerning which they do not deliberate, namely happiness. Humans achieve this end by performing good human acts, which are produced by the intellect and the will, and perfected by the relevant virtues. These virtuous acts require that the (...) agent grasps the relevant moral principles and uses them in particular cases. (shrink)

Ethics practice is both relative and situational. Perhaps there is an area of no greater demonstration of these realities than where an organization, be it a public governmental entity and/or a quasi-governmental entity with government contracts has the duty of care owed to a vulnerable constituency as well as to other community stakeholders. These agencies have the public trust as well as the ethical caretaking concerns to master. In the following fact scenario and discussion, one would consider a situation where (...) the care of the vulnerable constituency is the paramount concern and the facilitation of that care is also in question. Human Resource and leadership teams need to be cognizant of not only impropriety of members within their organization but also the appearance of impropriety as well. The following case study attempts to put into perspective the need for managers and HR representatives to monitor practice and perception of ethical behavior. (shrink)

Thomas claims that a human act is specified both by the object and the end, and that the exterior act is the interior act’s object. These claims are best understood in light of the De Malo’s explicit mature teaching that the exterior act can be essentially good or bad, and that it is both the proximate end and the object of the interior act. Since the interior act wills the end, it wills the apprehended exterior act as the formality (...) under which the whole act is willed. The interior and exterior acts do not form the one human act merely as cause and effect, but also as matter and form. These clarifications explain some problematic texts in the Summa Theologiae. (shrink)

Although Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent, and Godfrey of Fontaines disagree with each other profoundly over the relationship between the intellect and the will, they all think that someone who sees God must also love him in the ordinary course of events. However, Godfrey rejects a central thesis argued for by both Henry and Giles, namely that by God’s absolute power there could be such vision without love. The debate is not about the ability to freely reject or at (...) least refrain from willing complete happiness, but about the connection between the known object and the will’s act. Godfrey’s discussion is an occasion for him to criticize Giles’ idiosyncratic view that an elicited act of love for the known object is necessary for every act of knowing, and Henry’s development of the view that the known object is merely a sine qua non cause of an act of love. In his response, Godfrey defends a thesis that later becomes widespread, namely that the known object is an efficient cause of love. (shrink)

In his discussion of how future contingents are known and revealed Thomas systematized what Augustine had developed in his disputes with the Stoics and Pelagians. Thomas shows how logical determinism concerning future contingents is avoided by Aristotelian logic, according to which future contingents have no determinate truth. Moreover, he explicitly unravels how our understanding of causal contingency and necessity is applicable only to created causes. Nevertheless, Augustine had explicitly done the same when he criticized the Stoics not for (...) their position that every event is ordered, but rather for not recognizing that this order must include God’s causal power. Moreover, Augustine’s discussion of God’s promise to Abraham stresses that only God can move the will without taking away its freedom. The truth of the promise is based on the truth of what God will do. Similarly, Thomas stresses that knowledge of future contingents can only be prophetic, since they are present only in God and have determinate truth only on account of his decision to cause them. Augustine did not go into detail concerning how future truths are usually known insofar as they are present in their causes, but Thomas’ position is compatible with that of Augustine and may go some way towards explaining its deeper philosophical implications. The similarity of Thomas and Augustine on the problem of prophecy and foreknowledge is an instance of how Thomas often agrees with Augustine on substance, even though he expresses his view in a more systematic and precise fashion. The most relevant texts of Augustine on this issue are polemical. There is even development in Augustine, as he moves from his relatively simple concerns about necessity in the De libero arbitrio to the more sophisticated treatments in the Ad Simplicianum, the De civitate dei and the anti-Pelagian writings. Thomas’ texts are scholastic. Consequently, he is able to discuss one topic at length and to use conceptual resources borrowed or developed from Aristotle. Nevertheless, there is no reason to conclude that Thomas’ development of these themes betrays Augustine any more than Augustine’s own development betrays his earlier writings. On this issue Thomas is truly Augustinian. (shrink)

Banez’ commentary on I, q. 3, art. 3, is justly well-known for the criticism of earlier Thomists and for its metaphysical acuity. But Banez’ skill is best seen when we read not only his commentary, but the other texts which he himself was reading, such as the works of Capreolus, Soncinas, and Cajetan. In particular, he connects three issues which at first glance might seem unrelated, namely the view that esse is the ultimate act, that it is reduced to the (...) categories, and that it is less perfect than essence. The view that esse is the ultimate act implies that it can be reduced to the category of what is prior to it as the imperfect to the perfect. The position that essence on its own is prior and belongs to a category can lead to the view that essence is more perfect than esse. (shrink)

This book treats the thirteenth-century debate concerning the natural love of God over self with an eye to how the thinkers of this period saw the connection between one's own good and the aims of virtuous action. It shows that the main difference in this debate reflects a fundamental contrast between Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus over the importance of natural inclination in Ethics and the priority of the common good. It indicates how medieval thinkers attempted to reconcile (...) eudaimonism with the claim that everyone must love the common good more than themselves. It considers perhaps the most crucial issue in the thirteenth-century reception of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. It also indicates how later theories that separate morality from self-interest have their origins in concepts that were created in earlier debates, such as this one. (shrink)